Added: Teah Favreau - Date: 20.12.2021 10:12 - Views: 42400 - Clicks: 2945
The SDA prohibits direct discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy. Direct discrimination on the ground of pregnancy is described in s 7 1 of the SDA. It is accepted that the taking of maternity leave is a characteristic that appertains generally to pregnant women under s 7 1 b. In Iliff the applicant failed to satisfy Iliff women sex court of either of these elements. Shortly before she was due to return, SC wrote to her and informed her that the company had been restructured and as part of the restructure her position had been made redundant.
SC further said that a new position had been created, but the company did not consider that that it was a suitable alternative position for her current role. They offered to pay Ms Iliff a redundancy payment conditional upon her ing a release that confirmed that she had no further claims against them and that she had returned all company property.
Gordon J rejected ground one of the cross-appeal. Her Honour held that the conclusion reached by Allsop J in Thomson was premised on a factual finding that the company in that case was prejudiced against women taking maternity leave. In contrast in Iliff.
On the contrary. The decision in Iliff demonstrates that there are two reasons that the direct pregnancy discrimination provisions in the SDA offer women on maternity leave limited protection. The first reason arises from the manner in which the comparator was formulated by Allsop J in the decision of Thompson. Belinda Smith has been critical of the comparator formulated by Allsop J in Iliff women sex and applied by Burchardt FM in Iliff because it requires the comparison to be with someone on leave.
No distinction was made between maternity leave and any other sort of leave, despite the acknowledged connection between maternity and pregnancy a protected trait and traditional source of disadvantage. The formulation of the comparator therefore permits employers to treat a woman less favourably because she is on leave which appears to be contrary to the intention of the legislation.
It also fails to recognise that maternity leave should not be treated in the same way as other forms of leave and should be given special protection. The decision in Iliff illustrates that a further limitation in the protection offered by the SDA is the formulation of the causation test.
This in effect means that the SDA permits women to be disadvantaged as a consequence of taking maternity leave. Given the difficulties posed by the comparator and causation tests the direct pregnancy discrimination provisions of the SDA only go a limited way to addressing the workplace disadvantage that women experience as the result of pregnancy. Direct discrimination on the grounds of maternity leave The SDA prohibits direct discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy.
Application of the comparator test Gordon J rejected ground one of the cross-appeal. In contrast in Iliff there was nothing to suggest that the management at Sterling Commerce had a negative attitude towards maternity leave. Comparator Belinda Smith has been critical of the comparator formulated by Allsop J in Thomson and applied by Burchardt FM in Iliff because it requires the comparison to be with someone on leave.Iliff women sex
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